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Abstract: Unemployment  is  one  of  the  greatest  social  problems  all
around  the  world,  including  in  modern  capitalist  welfare  states.  A
social critique of unemployment is therefore a necessary task for any
critical  social  philosophy  –  such  as  Axel  Honneth’s  recognition
approach,  which  understands  social  justice  in  terms  of  social
conditions of recognition. This paper aims to develop an evaluation of
unemployment and its moral weight from this perspective. I will lay out
the  recognition  approach  and  present  a  moral  evaluation  of
unemployment as socially unjust based on knowledge of its negative
consequences for those affected. I will then discuss two objections to
this conclusion, namely that a mere correlation of suffering and moral
wrongness is not enough, and that there are legitimate differences in
the  experience  of  recognition  which  could  justify  the  existence  of
unemployment as deserved. In the next section, I will then refute both
objections and first  show that unemployment can be understood as
socially unjust based on the knowledge that it is involuntary and that
the  unemployed are  not  responsible  for  their  condition.  Then  I  will
discuss  the  relationship  between  the  idea  of  meritocracy  and
unemployment  to  examine  the  assumption  that  unemployment  is
deserved. I will finally conclude that unemployment is not a necessary
side effect of meritocracy, and that there are good reasons to argue for
a moral and justified obligation to provide actual access to paid work
for all who want it. However, such changes face serious obstacles and
are not likely to happen under current interpretations of meritocracy
and social esteem, which are one-sided and flawed.
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Resumen: El desempleo es uno de los problemas sociales más grandes en
todo el mundo, incluidos los modernos Estados de bienestar capitalistas.
Una crítica social del desempleo es por tanto necesaria para cualquier
filosofía social crítica- así sucede con el enfoque del reconocimiento de
Axel  Honneth,  que  entiende  la  justicia  social  en  términos  de  las
condiciones sociales de reconocimiento. Este artículo trata de desarrollar
una evaluación del  desempleo y su peso moral desde esta perspectiva.
Presentaré el enfoque del reconocimiento y defenderé un análisis moral
del desempleo como algo socialmente injusto basado en el conocimiento
de  sus  consecuencias  negativas  para  los  afectados.  A  continuación,
discutiré  dos  objeciones  a  esta  conclusión,  a  saber,  que  la  mera
correlación de sufrimiento e incorrección moral no es suficiente y que hay
diferencias  legítimas  en la  experiencia  del  reconocimiento  que  podrían
justificar la existencia del desempleo como algo merecido En la siguiente
sección  refutaré  ambas  objeciones  y  mostraré  en  primer  lugar  que  el
desempleo puede ser considerado socialmente injusto en la medida en
que es involuntario y que los desempleados no son responsables de su
condición.  A  continuación  discutiré  la  relación  entre  la  idea  de
meritocracia y desempleo para examinar la asunción de que el desempleo
es merecido. Por último concluiré afirmando que el desempleo no es un
efecto secundario necesario de la meritocracia y que hay buenas razones
para  abogar  por  la  obligación  moral  justificada  de  proveer  acceso  al
trabajo remunerado a quienes lo buscan. Sin embargo, tales cambios se
topan con serios obstáculos debidos a las actuales interpretaciones de la
meritocracia y la estima social, que son unidireccionales y defectuosas.
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odern  societies  are  working  societies  in  the  sense  that  paid
work is not just one activity among others but something that
serves several important functions (Dejours and Deranty 2010).
It  is  the  main  source  of  income,  social  status  and  recognition;  it
structures both one’s  life  course and one’s  everyday life,  and in many
countries  is  connected  to  social  protections  such  as  health  and
unemployment insurance or pension claims. Also, the taxation of income
is  a  major  means  for  all  modern  states  to  finance  their  various
expenditures.  It  is  consequently  no  surprise  that  unemployment,  and
especially  involuntary  unemployment,  is  connected to  various forms of
harm  and  hardship,  social  and  psychological  burdens  and  overall
generally  decreased life  satisfaction (McKee-Ryan et  al.  2005;  Wanberg
2012). Besides these personal impacts of unemployment, its social and
economic  effects  have also  been widely  discussed and researched.  For
example,  unemployment  imposes huge costs on the unemployed,  their
families, and their communities, as well as social security systems. The
management  of  unemployment  –  through  the  labour  market  or  social
policy – is one of the key areas of modern politics, and, especially due to
the ongoing crisis, is a key challenge. The crisis has eradicated millions of
jobs and it will certainly take some time before these return; if they do, it
is highly unlikely that those who lost their jobs will get them back again.
Many  of  these  people  will  be  too  old  or  too  long  out  of  training  and
employment  to  have  any  chance  on  the  labour  market.  Anti-
unemployment  politics  is  one of  the spearheads of  capitalistic  politics,
under the slogan that any form of paid work is better than none and that
jobs have to be created at nearly any cost. Without doubt, the existence of
unemployment is often used to argue for workfare, for activation policies,
for the de-regulation and increased flexibility of the labour market, and
the weakening of workers’ rights (Peters 2012).
M
Unemployment is  a critical  focal  point  for  understanding  modern
societies,  because  it  reflects  so  many  aspects  of  capitalism.  If  work,
autonomy  and  welfare  are  the  positive  attributes  of  modernity,
unemployment is the centre of its failure, and the ongoing processes of
impoverishment,  social  exclusion  and  humiliation  that  are  its
consequence. The critique of unemployment is therefore one of the main
tasks of any critical social philosophy and theory, and its particular form
and content has always to be considered. By “critical theory” I do not refer
only to the concept developed by the early Frankfurt School, but rather
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refer to the more general intellectual and political enterprise of uncovering
the inner dialectic of capitalism, its dynamic intertwining of liberation and
oppression and the suffering it brings upon the many while the few live in
clover (Honneth 2007). This paper hopes to engage with some aspects of
such a  critical  theory  of  unemployment  based on the writings  of  Axel
Honneth and others who understand capitalism, its social and economic
figuration,  as  the  institutionalization  of  patterns  of  recognition  and
misrecognition (Honneth 1996; Honneth 2003; Petherbridge 2011). This
approach is  not  meant  to  break down economic  issues into  individual
issues but rather to interpret the social world, which includes the social
organization of the economy and the labour market, as shaped by ongoing
and  often  conflicting  struggles  for  recognition.  Unemployment  is
embedded within these struggles and within such institutionalization of
recognition and misrecognition,  and  it  can therefore  be  reconstructed,
analysed and criticized with the instruments of the recognition approach.
However,  as  I  will  also  try  to  demonstrate,  such  a  recognition-based
critique reveals internal tensions within the recognition approach itself,
which remain – so far –unsolved. A critique of unemployment is therefore
as much a critique of unemployment as it is a critique of the criticizing
theory itself. This is another important feature of any critical theory, i.e.,
that it understands itself as much as a part of conflicting social practices
as something that reflects them – it cannot take any stance outside of
social reality.
I  will  now lay out  the recognition approach and present  a  moral
evaluation of unemployment as socially unjust, based on the knowledge of
its  negative  consequences  for  those  affected.  I  will  then  discuss  two
objections to this conclusion, namely that a mere correlation of suffering
and  moral  wrongness  is  not  enough,  and  that  there  are  legitimate
differences  in  the  experience  of  recognition  which  could  justify  the
existence of unemployment as deserved. Next, I will refute both objections
and show that unemployment can be understood as socially unjust based
on the knowledge that it is involuntary and that the unemployed are not
responsible  for  their  condition.  Then  I  will  discuss  the  relationship
between  the  idea  of  meritocracy  and  unemployment  to  examine  the
assumption that unemployment is deserved. I will finally conclude that
unemployment  is  not  a  necessary  side  effect  of  meritocracy,  and  that
there are good reasons to argue for a moral and justified obligation to
provide actual access to paid work for all  who want it.  However,  such
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changes face serious obstacles and are not likely to happen under current
interpretations of meritocracy and social esteem, which are one-sided and
flawed.
I. Recognition and social organization of social esteem
The recognition approach of Honneth combines ethical, social, theoretical
and political aims, which are all pursued by a methodology of immanent
critique (Schmidt am Busch 2010; Smith 2012). While the ethical aim is
to build a theory of morality and of social justice based on the securing of
undistorted  experiences  of  recognition  and  the  absence  of  illegitimate
misrecognition,  the social  theoretical  claim is  to understand the social
world  as  the  institutionalization  of  such  patterns  of  recognition  and
misrecognition and to explain the inner dynamic of social change as the
result of struggles for proper recognition. The political claim is then to
design  politics  and  political  change  upon  these  ethical  and  social
theoretical  insights  and  to  support  such  groups  and  movements  that
struggle  for  a  more  inclusive  society.  So,  while  the  social  theoretical
dimension of the recognition approach engenders knowledge about how
the  social  world  functions  –  and  can  also  be  used  as  the  basis  for
empirical research – the ethical theory describes what is morally wrong in
this social world and how it should change. Both are needed for political
theory and practice. All three tasks of the recognition approach do not use
the so-called ”God's-eye view” on the social but rather situate themselves
within  the  social  relations  they  criticize,  and show that  the  means  to
criticize the social  world lie within that world itself.  What counts as a
successful institutionalization of recognition and the content of morality
cannot  be  derived  from  any  abstract  principles,  but  rather  unfolds
through historical and social change driven by struggles for recognition.
Legitimate social struggles claim an adequate or expanded realization of
such social relations in which the experience of undistorted recognition is
possible and secured.
The normative core of the recognition approach, which is also the
core  of  its  social  theoretical  reconstruction of  the  social  world  and its
political  agenda,  is  an understanding of  the  undistorted and adequate
experience  of  three  basic  forms  of  recognition  as  the  inter-subjective
condition of identity, selfhood and the ability to lead a good life (Honneth
1996;  Honneth  2003).  These  three  forms  of  recognition  are  care  and
personal  relationships,  legal  respect  (expressed  mainly  in  rights),  and
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social  esteem.  Personal  relationships  reflect  unique  individuality;  legal
respect  is  based  on  autonomy,  and  social  esteem  is  earned  by  one’s
contribution to a shared goal or within a community. Only the basic forms
of  these  three aspects  are  universal;  their  concrete contents can vary,
change  and  may  even  interfere  with  each  other,  which  can  lead  to
struggles of recognition about proper interpretation and realization. These
struggles are often based not only on the absence or misinterpretation of
recognition – which could be understood as non-recognition – but on the
experience  of  misrecognition,  which  is  the  negative  reflection  of
recognition  and  is  also  institutionalized  in  social  practices  in  various
forms.  Honneth  distinguishes  here  physical  and  psychological  harm,
disrespect  and  the  denial  of  equal  rights,  and  denigration  and
humiliation. The task of a critical social philosophy and theory is then to
uncover such patterns and developments of misrecognition or distorted
recognition.  Such  social  phenomena,  which  are  disrespectful  or
experienced as harmful by those affected, are to be criticized, analysed
and ultimately changed. The work of social critique takes as its starting
point the negativity experienced by the poor, the alienated, the oppressed
and the unemployed.
To  undertake  an  effective  critique  of  society  one  must  start  by  taking  into
account instances of injustice or violations of standards of justice. In contrast to
its positive counterpart, the experience of injustice possesses greater normative
bite. As such, for Honneth, no experience of injustice must be ignored even if its
public expression is fraught with danger and difficulty. This approach to social
justice and normativity is typical of the Frankfurt School, which grounds the
motivation for social resistance and liberation movements not on grand theories
of intellectuals but on people’s everyday experience. (Pilapil 2011, 81)
From this  starting  point,  the  ethical  goal  of  recognition-based
political practice is then to establish such social relations, such a society
in which every member has the opportunity and the ability to experience
undistorted forms of  recognition – personal  relationships,  legal  respect
and social esteem – so that his or her claims and struggles for recognition
are satisfied. On the one hand, this means that social justice is a means
to  secure  the  conditions  to  experience  recognition;  although it  cannot
secure  actual  experience  itself  because  some  experiences  cannot  be
socially controlled – for example that of being loved by others, or feeling
adequately recognized for one’s activities by family and friends. On the
other hand such a socially just society – in which everyone experiences
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recognition, is protected from misrecognition and is able to lead a good life
– is only a regulative ideal, which in reality will always be broken because
of the inner conflicts between different claims for recognition. 
Despite  the  incalculable  variations,  historically  and  also  between
different cultures, social contexts and habits, which express recognition,
and in the forms of which recognition and misrecognition are experienced,
there are universal patterns that are important in all modern societies.
Universal  does  not  mean  that  these  are  of  equal  importance  for  all
members and that there are no exceptions or breaches, but rather that
these  patterns  are  particularly  powerful  in  the  social  life  of  modern
societies  and that  they structure  and determine what  can be called a
“normal” or “standard” life in these societies. This also implies that those
spheres of social life that are filled with recognition are always equally
filled  with  misrecognition,  and  are  the  arenas  for  these  struggles  for
recognition.  The  most  important  of  these  social  practices  is  work  and
labour,  solely  because  it  fulfils  all  these  different  functions  for  the
individual, the society and the state. In addition, closely connected to the
sphere of work and labour, is social esteem, and what Honneth calls the
“achievement principle” (Leistungsprinzip) (Honneth 2003, 140ff). This is
the key to the normative ideal of meritocracy, in which everyone gets what
he or she deserves according to his or her achievements or contributions.
According  to  Honneth  this  was  the  main  point  of  reference  for  the
overcoming of feudalism and the formation of civil, bourgeois society.
The members of such societies then esteem one another on the basis of the
social usefulness of their achievements; the more useful they are to society, the
higher the social esteem they will enjoy. [...] According to [Honneth], the world of
work is the place where social esteem is distributed. With regard to the greater
or lesser amounts of social esteem to which an individual has a claim, however,
it is now the social usefulness of his or her occupational work that is decisive.
On the basis of this ‘gradual’ conception of social esteem, Honneth then asserts
that  income that  is  commensurate  to the social  usefulness of  the activity  it
remunerates is the institution in which the society’s esteem of the individual
‘legitimately’ manifests itself. He adds that by establishing this form of social
esteem,  bourgeois-capitalist  societies  have  ‘meritocratized’  the  pre-modern,
feudal conception of honour. (Schmidt am Busch 2010, 265)
However,  social  esteem and  the  “achievement  principle”  are  also
highly organized and institutionalized. Both inside and outside the sphere
of work and labour they are embedded in certain patterns of practices and
reactions,  not  randomly  experienced  or  determined.  This  is  a  form of
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security, so that one can know and expect to be socially esteemed in a
certain  way  for  one’s  contribution,  but  this  also  excludes  many
contributions which are  not  esteemed at  all  or  only  insufficiently.  The
worker who does his or her work adequately to the standards set by the
employer  can  expect  to  receive  pay,  to  be  appreciated  by  his  or  her
colleagues, friends and family, and to gain a certain social status. It is
here where certain forms of  social  esteem are transformed into rights,
which are secured by the state and are no longer in the hands of the
employer, or which become matters of collective bargaining. However, this
inclusion and protection, which are the results of struggles for workers’
rights,  are  in  no  way  universal.  Not  only  are  many  forms  of  work
unregulated and dominated by the unequal relationship of power between
employers and workers, but there are also many forms of work which are
not recognized adequately at all. These include, for example, jobs done by
illegal  immigrants,  in  female-dominated  professions  and  care  work
(Anderson 2010). For these forms of work and labour, social esteem is
precarious;  jobs  are  paid  badly,  insecure,  come  with  bad  working
conditions, and do not earn any social status; they are not recognized but
rather  misrecognized  and denigrated.  This  dialectic  of  recognition  and
misrecognition is inherent in the “achievement principle”.
Once  we  become  cognizant  of  the  many  superimpositions  and  distortions
inherent in the capitalist achievement principle, it is hard to see any normative
principle of mutual recognition in it at all. Nevertheless, putting the new idea
into social practice indeed did away with the estate-based form of social esteem,
and  at  least  normatively  sustains  the  demand  that  the  contributions  of  all
members  of  society  be  esteemed  according  to  their  achievements.  (Honneth
2003, 147)
As  a  consequence,  most  of  the  social  theoretical  and  empirical
research that has been carried out based on the recognition approach has
focused on work, seeking to explore how recognition is structured within
and by work and labour, how it develops and what conflicts of recognition
take place here (Honneth 2010; Petersen 2004; Smith and Deranty 2012).
The sphere of work structures – not entirely, but to a large extent – and
influences all other areas of social life, an individual life’s course, family,
private life, consumption and social security (Kohli 2007). Marie Jahoda
has developed and established the manifest and latent functions of work,
which are irreplaceable by other activities even if material maintenance is
secured (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, and Zeisel 1972). Newer research confirms
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the accuracy of this theory of the working society (Paul and Batinic 2009).
Work  and  labour  therefore  affect  all  three  forms  of  recognition;  they
influence and are influenced by care and personal relationships, respect
and rights, and social esteem. However, paid work is the most important
factor for social esteem, to such an extent that the labour market is the
universal  integration machine within  modern societies  based on social
esteem and the “achievement principle”. Social esteem can be experienced
outside of paid work, but it can never replace the absence of the social
esteem earned through and by it.
II. On the moral wrongness and injustice of unemployment
I have argued that the recognition approach views paid work and labour
as being of  high importance and as the  main social  relation in which
social  esteem is  earned.  Some recent  sociological  studies  have already
confirmed the fruitfulness of  this approach (Voswinkel 2012).  However,
there  is  also  an outside  to  the  sphere  of  paid work and labour  –  the
sphere  of  unemployment  and  non-recognized  work.  It  is  within  this
triangle  of  paid  work,  social  esteem and  unemployment  that  a  social
critique of  unemployment  is  situated.  Honneth himself  has noted that
unemployment should be understood as a form of misrecognition rather
than a form of positive freedom:
A mere glance at studies of the psychological effects of unemployment makes it
clear that the experience of labour must be assigned a central position in the
model emerging here. The acquisition of that form or recognition that I have
called social esteem continues to be bound up with the opportunity to pursue
an economically rewarding and thus socially  regulated occupation. (Honneth
2007, 75)
Given the manifold functions of work, it comes as no surprise that
unemployment is a harmful experience. It is true that the consequences of
unemployment  for  the  unemployed  and  also  for  their  families  and
communities  are  widely  studied  and,  to  at  least  some extent,  are  the
direct negative results of the positive functions of paid work and labour.
The unemployed are often poor in many aspects, such as limited social
inclusion, reduced income and other material goods, and reduced living
standards;  the  unemployed  also  suffer  more  often  from  physical  and
mental ill-health and problems (McKee-Ryan et al. 2005; Paul and Moser
2009; Wanberg 2012). Furthermore, unemployment, especially if it is of
longer duration, is experienced as denigrating, stressful and humiliating.
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These negative effects are not experienced by all and there are several
different  coping  mechanisms that  can be employed to  limit  them,  but
resilience  factors  –  such  as  education  and  information,  functioning
networks  and  connections  or  sources  of  support  –  are  also  unequally
distributed.  In conclusion,  to be unemployed in a working society is  a
harmful and excluding experience.
So, if work and labour are the ultimate resources for social esteem,
it  is  convincing to argue that their  absence is  harmful.  A lot  of  social
research  has  confirmed  this  assumption.  An  initial  examination  of
unemployment  from  the  perspective  of  the  recognition  approach  can
conclude that it is socially unjust because it is connected to such various
forms of misrecognition as poverty, denigration, distress or humiliation.
This  conclusion  is  well  founded  on  empirical  knowledge  about
unemployment  that  is  also  articulated  by  those  who  are  unemployed.
Their  suffering  can serve  as  a  starting  point  for  the  social  critique  of
unemployment. They are limited in their experiences of recognition and
affected in their opportunities to live a good life. But it is important to
stress  that  this can only  be the starting point;  it  is  not  enough for a
normative social  philosophical  critique of  unemployment,  which has to
explore the moral wrongness and injustice of unemployment. But why is
the suffering connected to unemployment not enough to confirm its moral
wrongness?  Does  not  the  connection  between  work  and  social  esteem
provide the necessary basis to criticize unemployment? I do not think that
there  is  a  simple  connection  between  empirical  knowledge  and  moral
judgement  and  I  do  think  that  this  reveals  an  inner  dialectic  of  the
recognition approach itself. Two arguments can be brought forward that
weaken  or  even  refute  the  easy  conclusion  that  the  suffering  of
unemployment  shows  its  moral  wrongness.  The  first  argues  that
unemployment  can be  deserved as  a  form of  punishment;  the  second
argues  that  unemployment  can  be  deserved  because  paid  work  is  a
competitive good, and that not everyone should have work because this
would diminish its positive and also moral value.
Firstly,  then  –  the  most  prominent  negative  consequences  of
unemployment are poverty, or at least financial losses and negative effects
on mental health, such as distress, depression, anxiety, psychosomatic
symptoms,  and  decreased  subjective  well-being  and  self  esteem.
Furthermore, unemployment not only affects the unemployed person but
also his or her family, children and, if widespread, the whole community
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and society. These are all harmful consequences and without doubt they
are important for  any critique of  unemployment;  however,  they are all
experienced equally by those who are incarcerated. There is significant
evidence that being in prison has negative consequences – also on the
prisoner's  family  and  children  –  and  it  is  highly  doubtful  that  these
consequences  can  be  prevented  entirely  by  increasing  the  quality  of
imprisonment (Hagan and Dinovitzer 1999; Schnittker and John 2007).
There are even good arguments that the whole purpose of imprisonment
is that it  negatively affects the lives of those who are found guilty and
convicted. It is part of the punishment that life in prison is hard and that
it should not be socially esteemed to be in prison – which it is, in some
social  groups.  I  do  not  want  to  overwork  this  comparison  of
unemployment and imprisonment – but what are the reasons that make
comparable suffering morally wrong in one case and rightful in another?
Why is the provocative thesis wrong whereby unemployment and all its
negativity is the rightful punishment for those who are lazy or do not want
to work? Can unemployment be deserved? A social philosophical critique
of unemployment cannot be satisfied with just noting that unemployment
is  a  harmful  experience  –  it  has  to  bring  forward  reasons  why  these
experiences of misrecognition are unjustified and wrong.
The second argument is concerned with the concept of social esteem
itself,  and  I  think  that  this  is  more  compelling  for  the  recognition
approach.  It  is  illuminating  that  Honneth  cites  the  negative  effects  of
unemployment to foster his argument that work and social esteem are so
closely tied, because this links the positivity of work with the negativity of
its absence. This is the peculiarity of social esteem which differentiates it
from the other two forms of recognition. It hurts not to be loved or to have
no close friends to support one just for being one’s self – but this hurt is
not  the  result  of  others  being  loved  and  having  such  personal
relationships. A world is possible – although admittedly highly unlikely –
in  which  everyone  experiences  love  and  friendship.  Legal  respect  is
universal in its nature, if not in its content, in that every human, whoever
they are, whatever they are like, or whatever they have done in their life,
is entitled to it.  That one is respected and has certain rights does not
imply that others are not – the idea of equality is in contrast to the idea of
universal respect. However, social esteem is a competitive good, which not
everyone can have at the same time for the same reason, because if all are
esteemed  equally,  ultimately  no  one  is,  and  the  concept  is  rendered
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useless  (Voswinkel  2012).  Social  esteem,  at  least  as  the  recognition
approach understands it, is a competitive good, which is of value exactly
because one gets it while others do not. This is especially the case in the
sphere of work. If one is esteemed for having done a good job then this
esteem becomes worthless, maybe even harmful, if everyone is esteemed
the  same  way,  even  those  who  have  not  done  a  good  job.  Praise  or
appreciation  for  one’s  contribution  is  worthy  because  not  everyone  is
praised. Social esteem points out the differences between people, between
their contributions, efforts and achievements. One is esteemed for being
something,  having  something  or  doing  something  above  and  beyond
others. Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch has convincingly argued that
one has good reasons to improve one’s social esteem at the expense of
others, and that necessarily produces winners and losers:
[I]n a society where people are esteemed according to the usefulness of their
work and where this usefulness is evaluated by the market economy, a human
individual is better positioned from the perspective of recognition theory when
his or her income rises and/or when the incomes of other people sink. As a
result,  such  an  individual  has  a  recognition-based  reason  to  strive  for  an
improvement of his or her income and to contribute to the reduction of other
persons’ incomes. Moreover, since in the present context no maximum in the
difference in income can be established, such an individual has a recognition-
based reason to always strive anew for both an improvement in his or her own
income and for a reduction in other people’s incomes by virtue of participating
in the social practice of social esteem. (Schmidt am Busch 2010, 270–71)
This argument can ultimately be expanded to cover unemployment
too. If one has reason to aim to earn more social esteem for one’s work,
then one also has reason to be glad that not all people are working in the
first place, as this would necessarily result in one’s social esteem being
lower.  Therefore,  my second argument against the moral  wrongness of
unemployment  is  based  on  the  whole  idea  of  social  esteem  and  its
differentiation between those in work and those who are unemployed. If
the recognition approach assumes that the value of social esteem is based
on  difference  and  particularly  on  the  difference  one  earns  for  one’s
achievements in work, then the access to paid work is a form of social
esteem itself. Would it not undermine the value of work if everyone were
employed? If the social esteem gained through work and labour is thought
of as a form of merit and desert, the question arises again as to whether it
can be deserved to be unemployed. Considering these objections, I will
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now examine on what grounds unemployment can be morally criticized.
III. Unemployment in a meritocracy
First, I will refute the assertion that unemployment should be understood
as a form of legitimate punishment and show how it can be understood as
a form of  injustice  and moral  harm.  The  main argument  here  is  that
legitimate punishment demands that people are responsible in a strong
sense for the actions for which they are punished.  This is also a core
demand for  the  notion of  desert.  It  is  exactly  this  prerequisite  that  is
missing  in  most  if  not  all  cases  of  unemployment  in  modern working
societies.  Thus,  unemployed people  have  not  done  anything  wrong  for
which one can say they deserve their unemployment.
The overwhelming empirical evidence shows that unemployment is
not the result of individual choices or failures, but most often the result of
the social and economic conditions in which people have grown up and
lived. Despite differences, these findings apply in general to all modern
welfare societies, to the Anglo-American model as well as to the European.
The  most  important  possible  reasons  for  unemployment  are  economic
downturn, limited access to proper education and training, growing up in
families that are not able to properly support their children, or limited
information  and  access  to  networks  that  can  help  with  a  job  search
(Blanchard 2006; Lindvall 2010). In 2010, the European Centre for the
Development of Vocational Training estimated the jobs lost in Europe due
to the crisis to be as high as ten million, and predicted that the labour
markets  will  not  recover  until  2020  (Cedefop  2010).  This  is  a  whole
generation lost without any responsibility, with social effects and costs
that go way beyond individual harm.
The labour market does not have enough jobs for all and the starting
chances are highly unequally distributed. The most important bases on
which later  success on the labour market  depends on are laid during
childhood and adolescence,  and it  appears  reasonable  to  assume that
children and young people are not or are only to a very limited extent
responsible for their upbringing and the education. This life-course and
ecological  perspective  on  unemployment  views  it  as  a  combination  of
actual and forerun choices and actions embedded in social circumstances
that  are  beyond  the  individuals’  control,  giving  good  reasons  to  view
unemployment as a structural rather than an individual failure.
Another portion of the unemployed are simply not able to compete
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on the modern and performance-oriented labour market because they are
chronically ill or otherwise challenged, because they have duties of care or
because they are deemed too young or too old (Cornwell et al. 2009; Wu
and Eamon 2011). The negative consequences of unemployment and the
shared  conviction  that  paid  work  and  labour  are  one  of  the  most
important things in life are highly motivating even for people that have
little chance on the labour market; only a very small group of people can
be called voluntarily unemployed (Chadi 2010).  It  would also be short-
sighted to assume that most of those who have stopped searching for a
job are  voluntarily  unemployed.  This  is  in most  cases rather  a  coping
mechanism to deal with the ongoing experience of physical, mental and
social harm during unemployment and some people have simply given up
on themselves.
The evidence – which is only a small portion of the social empirical
and theoretical research on the prevalence and causes of unemployment –
refutes the conclusion that unemployment is  the result  of  a voluntary
decision or an individual’s failure to find a job. It cannot, therefore, be
assumed that in a morally coherent sense it is deserved to be unemployed
or  to  encounter  its  negative  consequences  such  as  poverty,  social
exclusion  and  ill-health  (Schweiger  2013a).  These  effects  are  the
consequence  of  the  current  social,  political  and  economic  order.  It  is
unjust to be unemployed for reasons over which one has no real influence
and  to  suffer.  The  individualization  of  unemployment  and  poverty  are
mere cover-ups.
However,  do  these  considerations  that  under  today’s  social,
economic and political conditions most people are simply not responsible
for  their  unemployment  also  refute  the  second  argument  I  brought
forward  that  unemployment  could  be  the  necessary  consequence  of
meritocracy?  This  assertion of  unemployment  as  the  negative  but  still
justified result of a fair competition for social esteem is more difficult to
examine.  I  will  discuss  here  the  relationship  of  social  esteem  and
universal respect to sketch the answer that paid work is an important
prerequisite  of  social  esteem in a  working society  and that  this  social
basis has to be provided to all members of society. It is necessary under
the idea of meritocracy that everyone has actual access to paid work if he
or she wants to. This would certainly demand radical changes in how paid
work is organized, whether it be that the state secures this paid work and
labour, or whether this task is delegated to the private sector. I will argue
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that such a strong right to work also does not undermine the idea of a
meritocracy in which everyone should get the job one deserves and in
which  social  esteem should  be  distributed based  on  one’s  efforts  and
achievements.
The whole idea of a meritocracy is that people get what they deserve
based on merit and that only a few exceptions should be made to this
principle.  According  to  the  tripartite  of  recognition  these  exceptions
concern legal equality and respect, and also personal relationships. I will
not discuss the latter here because I  do not see any relevant tensions
between the social esteem gained through work and being loved for whom
one is,  but  such tension does exist  between social  esteem and having
certain  rights.  Every  human being  is  entitled  to  respect  as  a  form of
recognition,  but what is  in dispute is  the content of  this respect,  and
which different areas of life should be regulated by laws and which not.
There is no easy answer to these questions, but there are good arguments
to include certain social rights that guarantee provision with basic goods
and services. With these goods and services a decent living is possible
even if one is not able or willing to increase one’s living standards by any
means.  Honneth understands this balancing between social  rights and
the  “achievement  principle”  as  the  historic  development  of  the  welfare
state. 
But it was also precisely this principle of equal legal treatment that could be
mobilized in countless social struggles and debates, especially by the working
class, to establish social rights. Thus, the recognition sphere of the achievement
principle was in a certain way contained by the social-welfare state by making a
minimum  of  social  esteem  and  economic  welfare  independent  of  actual
achievement  and  transforming  them into  individual  rights  claims.  (Honneth
2003, 149)
Such a welfare provision, which is often criticized by defenders of
certain versions of liberalism, is also not in contrast to meritocracy but
rather one of its necessary conditions. This has a lot to do with the idea of
desert  (Olsaretti  2004),  which  only  makes  sense  based  on  two
assumptions.  Desert  demands  that  everyone  has  an  equal  chance  to
participate or compete for the goods in question. This means that equality
of opportunity is necessary for meritocracy. Furthermore, it is necessary
that the measures are the same for all. This is the fairness condition of
meritocracy. It would be unfair, and undermine the idea of desert, if A
were to receive X for Y but B Z for the same Y. There is a principle of
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equality built into the principle of desert. The “achievement principle” is
rather based on social rights and does not suspend them, although there
is a necessary tension between those forms of recognition. If someone is in
a good position to experience social esteem for his or her achievements,
which  allows  him  or  her  to  be  independent  of  protection  from  social
rights, for example because of a high income and high social status, then
this person has a recognition-based interest to opt against such a welfare
provision altogether, because this would increase his or her position and
therefore his or her social esteem in relation to those who are dependent
on  those  welfare  rights.  So,  even  if,  from  a  recognition-theoretical
perspective that takes into account the society as a whole, meritocracy
has to be off-set by the protection provided by social rights, equality of
opportunity and the fair distribution of social esteem, the individuals or
groups  that  compete  do  not  have  such  motivation.  This  theoretical
assumption  also  allows  for  in-depth  empirical  social  research  into
distributional  conflicts  as  struggles  for  recognition,  in  which  certain
groups have good reasons to opt against welfare while others have good
reasons  to  opt  for  it.  This  is  also  reflected  in  the  actual  formation  of
capitalistic  welfare  states,  where  some  tend  more  towards  the
“achievement principle” from which those who benefit are already better
off – this can be called the Matthew effect (Wade 2004) – whilst others
tend to provide more inclusive support and also to interfere with market
results (Heath 2011).
The question now is whether or not paid work and labour fall under
the concept of universal respect or under the “achievement principle”. I
will argue  that there are good reasons to say that access to paid work
should be interpreted as a form of universal respect. My main argument is
that it is a prerequisite for a meritocracy to make it possible for everyone
to work and to earn their achievements. Another argument refers to the
idea of community and contribution, saying that everyone has a right to
contribute according to his or her talents. One central aspect is that all
members of a society have equal access to paid work and labour, and that
they can actually compete for jobs and positions and within jobs for social
esteem.  This  implies  a  strong  understanding  of  equality  in  the  social
conditions  that  govern  access  to  paid  work,  especially  in  education,
upbringing,  social  background,  birthplace,  networks  or  advantages  in
information.  In  a  meritocratic  society  everyone  gets  what  he  or  she
deserves based on merit,  but the starting chances have to be levelled.
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Hence,  such a society  has  to  ensure  that  everyone  has  access  to  the
relevant social contexts and practices and that the competition for jobs,
position and other benefits is fair.
Furthermore,  as I  have argued,  social  esteem is just one form of
recognition and it cannot, therefore, rule all possible social contexts and
guide the distribution of all relevant goods and benefits. The “achievement
principle” has to be offset by a strong understanding of social equality,
and, as Honneth puts it, the market has to be tamed by the welfare state.
On the one hand this is necessary to secure a decent living for those who
cannot or are not willing to take care of themselves. This basic provision
is protected by social rights. On the other hand, it is necessary to secure a
fair  competition  on  the  market  itself.  Only  if  the  pre-market  social
contexts are shaped by social equality it is possible to think of the market
as an adequate distributor of social esteem. A third form of regulation is
also necessary,  and that concerns certain biases within the market to
undervalue certain forms of work and therefore to undermine the social
esteem that the people doing these jobs would deserve. These distortions
of  the  market  are  not  simple  market  failures  but  rather  built  into  its
orientation towards private profit,  which necessarily  undervalues social
goods.  The  state  has  to  produce  and  provide  these  public  goods  and
therefore  must  intervene  in  the  job  market  as  an  agent  that  employs
different  standards  of  desert  than  private  agents.  A  fourth  form  of
intervention is the regulation of how social esteem is distributed within
the market and also the outcomes of this distribution by the state. Labour
laws, social protection, regulations and taxation all are prerequisites of
the distribution of social esteem according to the “achievement principle”.
However, even if all people in a society have more or less the same
chances to compete for jobs and positions in the first place, which means
that  they  all  have  the  same  chance  to  earn  social  esteem and  to  be
esteemed for their achievements, still not everyone will get a job on the
“free” labour market and for certain not everyone will get the job that he
or she is aiming for or is qualified for. Jobs, especially good ones, i.e.,
those  that  come with  high  income,  social  status  and  power,  or  those
which are meaningful and engaging, are scarce in current capitalism, and
someone must do the “dirty” jobs too, i.e., underpaid jobs and those that
are physically or mentally hard and dangerous. Currently, most of these
precarious and undervalued jobs are done by women, migrants or people
with little formal education (Honneth 2003). However, these jobs do not
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vanish simply because the education system gets more equal or because
discrimination based on gender,  race  or  nationality  stops.  Even under
such “ideal” circumstances – which will probably never be fully achieved
under the current system – unemployment as well as precarious jobs will
exist if the state does not intervene and provide a job for people who have
no chance on the capitalistic job market, which will always produce lucky
winners and many losers.
If  modern  societies  are  working  societies,  and if  this  is  not  only
arbitrary but rather has an intrinsic worth and moral value, then it is a
moral obligation to make paid work and labour accessible to everyone in
order to distribute social esteem according to the “achievement principle”.
In fact, a more inclusive welfare provision is needed and also a society in
which equality of opportunity is more than a mere slogan behind which
the sheer luck of having the right birthplace, and the power of cliques and
money is hiding. If it is viewed to be of high moral value that certain goods
are  distributed  based  on  desert  for  one’s  efforts,  talents  and
achievements, and that the sphere of paid work is the main medium of
this  distribution,  then everyone should have access  to  it  and the real
opportunity to earn social esteem. This also does not undermine the idea
of hiring by merit and that a job itself should be deserved. David Miller –
whose  tripartite  theory  of  social  justice  resembles  the  three  forms  of
recognition, although they derive from a different perspective (Honneth
2012) – follows the same route when he argues for the best candidates to
deserve jobs and the connected rewards.
“To sum up, hiring by merit is the policy that in general brings about the closest
correspondence  between  individuals’  contributions  and  their  rewards.  […]
Nepotism or discrimination is unfair because it predictably creates a state of
affairs in which there is a discrepancy between deserts and income rewards.
Moreover,  the  best-qualified  candidate  who  is  passed  over  can  legitimately
complain that she is the victim of an injustice through being prevented from
earning rewards commensurate with her potential contribution.” (Miller 1999,
166)
Hiring by merit implies that the best candidate should get a certain
job,  but  it  does  not  imply  that  there  should  not  be  enough  jobs  for
everyone. A commitment to eliminate involuntary unemployment would
not undermine the idea that jobs should be deserved by merit and that
only qualified persons should become doctors, teachers or plumbers, and
that it would be unfair not to take the best candidate. The argument for
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the existence of unemployment based on the function of social esteem can
therefore  be  countered  by  the  argument  that  it  is  not  a  necessary
implication  of  social  esteem.  This  conclusion  allows  us  to  take  up
Honneth’s remarks about the consequences of unemployment again, but
to reinforce them. It is not only because unemployment has such harsh
and damaging consequences that it is morally wrong and unjust, but it is
because there is no ground to justify these consequences and they are
also  not  necessary  to  provide  room  for  social  esteem  and  to  value
meritocracy.
IV. Conclusions
There are important objections to the idea that the state can provide all its
citizens  with  a  decent  job  without  negative  economic  and  social
consequences,  and these have to  be  taken seriously.  Such a situation
would demand that either the state itself employ the unemployed, which
would come with hefty costs, or that the state force private employers to
do so. Both options would demand extensive administrative efforts and it
is unclear what kind of jobs the unemployed would be offered in such a
scenario. It is very likely that a job one only has because the state has
provided it  does not generate the same social esteem as a job one has
earned in competition with others. These jobs might even be experienced
as humiliating in themselves, and deteriorate into workfare programmes
in which the unemployed are forced to do the jobs that no one else wants;
it  is  also possible that the private sector would lower the wages of  all
employed or demand that they are subsidized by the state – scenarios that
are already seen in practice. Without major shifts in the current order of
recognition based on the capitalistic “achievement principle” this situation
would most likely lead to a division between the “good” jobs for which one
still has to compete and which are highly esteemed, and the “bad” jobs
provided by the state – for those “losers” who need them. The problem of
unemployment would be solved only superficially and most likely at least
some of the social and psychological problems caused by it would remain.
The  divide  would  no  longer  be  between  paid  work  and  labour  and
unemployment  but  rather  between good work and bad work,  or,  as  it
would  probably  be  referred  to,  “real”  work  and  “state”  work.  Such  a
division  –  which  would  restrict  the  experience  of  social  esteem  and
admiration  for  those  “real”  jobs  –  is  also  coherent  with  today’s
interpretation of the “achievement principle” that favours market success
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as the only relevant measure.
These objections are not easily to be dismissed, and they can lead us
to revise the strong conclusion about the right to work that I have drawn
above,  in  order  to  target  a  more  realistic  solution  for  the  problem  of
unemployment. As it is unlikely that political forces are strong enough to
radically change today’s capitalism and its division and organization of
paid  work  and  unemployment  it  seems  favourable  to  aim for  gradual
improvements to help the unemployed right now. Unemployment is still a
moral  wrongness and injustice  with  severe  and harmful  consequences
that have to be alleviated, and which will exist as long as access to paid
work is restricted by  market mechanisms, but the priority of social and
political change should be to make unemployment more decent and to
change the superstructure that  frames it  as an individual  failure.  The
flawed discourse that uses social esteem and the “achievement principle”
to  justify  unemployment  and  other  inequalities  such  as  poverty  and
precarization has to be criticized and countered (Schweiger 2013b). Only
then  can  the  recognition  approach  make  sure  that  it  does  not,
involuntarily,  support  oppressive  social  stratification  and  policies.  Two
more points should be considered in this regard: the development of the
“achievement principle” and the role of the unemployed as the possible
agents of change.
First,  it  is  unclear  how  the  “achievement  principle”  will  develop
itself.  As  many  critics  have  pointed  out,  today’s  understanding  and
interpretation  is  to  legitimize  and  esteem  only  certain  forms  of
achievements. This capitalistic and market-oriented interpretation is more
or less hegemonic in modern societies, although it is broken and in flux.
Certain developments over the past years have at least opened up spaces
for other interpretations of the “achievement principle”, like the rise of the
importance of self-realization outside the job, the demands of functioning
work-life balances or the ideal of individualism without egoism (Beck and
Beck-Gernsheim 2002; Hartmann and Honneth 2006; Honneth 2004). All
these  developments  are  certainly  not  free  of  their  own distortions and
paradoxes,  and are  also  accompanied  by  new forms of  alienation  and
oppression, but they show the possibility of changes in the second-order
structure  of  capitalism  from  which  the  ideas  of  the  “achievement
principle” and the working society unfold.
It is therefore possible that the progressive core of the “achievement
principle” and the moral core of social esteem can be mobilized to break-
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up their one-sided interpretation that focuses on paid work and labour,
leading  to  a  more  inclusive  understanding  of  work.  This  could
furthermore  shift  the  main focus from monetary  success  to  the  social
value of work, and thus trigger an expansion in the number of those who
work in these occupations. There is a great demand for such employment
in  care,  health,  education  and  culture.  So,  there  is  a  possibility  that
future developments may lead to a different allocation of social esteem
that  is  still  based on desert  and the  “achievement  principle”  but  that
provides  a  different  setting  for  what  today  is  understood  as
unemployment,  namely  the  inability  to  find  a  decent  job  on  the  free
market. This is inherent in the dialectic of the three forms of recognition,
that each social context and sphere can be shaped more by respect or
more by social esteem, and also the inner dialectic within each of these
forms. As I pointed out earlier, the recognition approach cannot once and
for all determine the content of each form of recognition, but rather leaves
this open to social interpretation, which is only measured if it points in
the direction of a more socially just society in which everyone has proper
conditions  to  experience  each  form of  recognition,  or  if  it  points  in  a
direction in which the experience of recognition is only protected for a few
while others have to live with misrecognition. Today it seems as if  one
particular  distorted  interpretation  of  social  esteem is  widespread,  and
serves as a justification to dismantle social rights and to intensify social
inequality across all  different contexts and goods – but this is not the
necessary content of the “achievement principle”.
“For  each  of  the  three  recognition  spheres  is  distinguished  by  normative
principles which provide their own internal standards of what counts as ‘just’ or
‘unjust.’ In my view, the only way forward here is the idea, outlined above, that
each principle of recognition has a specific surplus of validity whose normative
significance  is  expressed  by  the  constant  struggle  over  its  appropriate
application and interpretation. Within each sphere, it is always possible to set a
moral dialectic of the general and the particular in motion: claims are made for
a  particular  perspective  (need,  life-situation,  contribution)  that  has  not  yet
found appropriate  consideration by appeal  to  a general  recognition principle
love, law, achievement). In order to be up to the task of critique, the theory of
justice  outlined  here  can  wield  the  recognition  principles’  surplus  validity
against the facticity of their social interpretation.” (Honneth 2003, 186)
The second point concerns the agents of the “achievement principle”
–  those  who are  the  winners  and those  who are  the  losers  of  today’s
distinction  between  “good”  paid  work  and  “bad”  unemployment.  The
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recognition approach wants  to  stand on the side  of  social  movements
towards a more inclusive society and support those legitimate struggles
for  recognition.  However,  it  cannot  prescribe  social  justice  and it  also
cannot plan it in the academic ivory tower. Today’s unemployed are a very
heterogenic group and it seems therefore unlikely that they will organize
and struggle united for changes in their situation. They have no union,
they  have  no  public  support,  they  have  no  voice  and no  say  in  their
administration.  In  contrast,  the  fission between the  employed and the
unemployed is getting deeper and deeper and this prevents much needed
solidarity and united action. But without such struggles the hegemony of
the capitalistic interpretation of the “achievement principle”  will  prevail
and the moral core of social esteem will be undermined.
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